

# Arab-Israeli Conflict and US Economic and Geo-Strategic Interests in the Middle East

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**Abstract:** During the second half of the 20th century, the United States had a major impact on the Middle East. While the United States has used its authority to protect its national interests in the Middle East, other countries have supported their own national interests in the region. The foreign policy of the United States has had various outcomes, and these have produced new allies and adversaries. This is an inherent part of the United States' conflicting interests in the area. This study will look at the post-Cold War era and recent scenarios of Middle East war. This was the era when the United States had to confront a shifting geopolitical reality in the Middle East, in which the Soviet Union's fading influence was removed. Over the final decade of the 20th century, the United States has pursued a variety of national interests, some more important than others. While, the new era of war between Israel and Palestine will be discussed which impact the world. The goal of this study is to assess the success of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East and Arab-Israel conflict in the Middle East. This will be done through looking at U.S. foreign policy actions, namely the National Security Strategy, in the area to protect the country's national interests.

**Keywords:** Middle East, Cold War, United States, Arab-Israel conflict, U.S. foreign policy.

## 1. Introduction

During the second half of the 20th century, the United States had a major impact on the Middle East. U.S. global strategy placed the U.S. in a position to ensure the security of all American interests in the area. National interests may be at odds with one other in certain cases. In this case, the increased security of Israel and the country's demand for oil from the Arab nations in the area are relevant factors. There were significant variations in the outcomes of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. Even when implementing U.S. foreign policy, the outcomes and effect have produced opponents and foes, some of whom detest the United States enough to carry out terrorist acts inside the United States. Terrorism is a result of the foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East, which can't be fully addressed in this thesis, but is a major aspect of it. The goal of this research is to explain the United States' national interests in the Middle East from the time President Clinton left office until 2001, when George W. Bush became office. The goal of this thesis is to investigate

whether U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East serves U.S. national interests after the Cold War. Conflict between Arabs and Israelis Hitler's murder of European Jews served as a catalyst for the Zionist movement's revival. When the consequences of the Holocaust were apparent to American Jews, any concerns regarding Zionist support among the American people vanished, and American Jews increased their lobbying efforts in political circles. President Roosevelt's 1944 campaign promise demonstrates the effectiveness of the lobbying effort: "I am aware of how long and fervently the Jewish people have fought and prayed for the creation of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish state."

An outbreak of violence occurred on May 10, 2021, but previous incidents had happened, and the fighting ended on May 21, with a truce in force. The conflict was characterized by widespread demonstrations and civil unrest, military assaults by Israel on the Gaza Strip, and attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad on Israeli territory. The crisis was set off on May 6, when Palestinians started demonstrations in Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, upset about a proposed ruling by Israel's Supreme Court that would evict six Palestinian families. The territory, essentially seized by Israel, is considered to be a part of the occupied Palestinian territories under international law. The laws of Israel are applied in the Occupied Territories. On 7 May, according to Channel 12 in Israel, Palestinians hurled stones at Israeli police, who responded by deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades to assault the complex of the al-Aqsa Mosque. As a result of the crisis, demonstrations were held all across the globe, as well as responses from global leaders.

The violence occurred on the same day as Qadir Night (or the Feast of the Night of Power), celebrated by Muslims, and on the Israeli festival of Jerusalem Day (or Liberation Day). A series of violent clashes occurred before of a planned Jerusalem Day march, Dance of Flags, by Jewish nationalists who oppose the far-right ideology, and that march was ultimately called off. Hundreds of Palestinian civilians were wounded, some critically, which caused worldwide outrage. While the attorney general of Israel, Avichai Mandelblit, tried to calm tensions, the Supreme Court ruled on evictions from Sheikh Jarrah for a full

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30 days. Hamas issued Israel an ultimatum at 2:30 p.m. on the afternoon of 10 May to remove all Israeli security troops from the Temple Mount and the neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah by 6 p.m. When the ultimatum ran out of time with no answer, both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (both Islamic fundamentalist groups) fired missiles. A school and several homes were damaged by the missiles. During the month of May, Israel launched 950 airstrikes on Gaza, and as of 16 May, at least 18 structures including four high-rise skyscrapers, 40 schools, and four hospitals had been destroyed, and the al-Shati refugee camp had been hit as well. Besides that, Israeli bombardments have targeted at least 19 medical institutions as well. Israeli airstrikes on Gaza between 17 and 19 May reportedly damaged 94 structures, which included 461 dwelling and commercial units and the al-Jalaa Highrise, a 46-story apartment complex in which many media organisations including the AP reside.

According to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, at least 256 Palestinians, including 66 children, have been killed due to the violence. At least 13 people, including two children, have been murdered in Israel, as of this moment. As of 12 May, Israel claimed that at least 200 people had been wounded, while the Gaza Ministry of Health reported that at least 1,900 Palestinians had been injured. Palestinians have been displaced at least 72,000 people as of May 19, according to the UN. Since 4,360 rockets have been launched at Israel from Gaza, of which 680 have hit inside the Gaza Strip, and over 90% of missiles headed for population centers were intercepted by the Iron Dome, over 4,000 rockets have been fired at Israel from Gaza. At this point, the IDF has launched 1,500 air, land, and sea assaults against the Gaza Strip. Hamas called for a truce on 13 May, but Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, rejected the proposal. On May 18, France, Egypt, and Jordan jointly stated that they had filed a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire. Hamas and Israel agreed to a truce on May 21, 2021, which concluded 11 days of warfare. On June 16, a month from the date of this writing, Israel fired incendiary balloons into Gaza, which triggered numerous airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, resulting in another round of violence.

## 2. Statement of the Problem

Since the conclusion of the Second World War, the Middle East has been one of the most volatile and violent subsystems in world political systems. Middle East post-war history was marked by an exceptionally large number of inter-state conflicts. This research aims to examine the root causes of the greatest category of conflicts in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli wars. In this context the researcher aims to examine the geo-strategic and economic interest of the United States in the conflict between Israel and Arab countries.

## 3. Statement of the Problem

- i. The primary aim of this research is to determine the US interest in the war between Israel and Arabia. But the researchers aim to accomplish the following sub-

objectives for the effective completion of the study:

- ii. To assess the economic interest of the United States of America in the war between Arab and Israel
- iii. To assess US geographic strategy in the war between Arab and Israel
- iv. To determine the underlying cause of the conflict between Arab and Israel in the Middle East
- v. To provide a potential solution to the highlighted issues.

## 4. Methodology

Understanding the theoretical views of international relations offers a foundation for analyzing occurrences in the international political system. Our methodological approach thus involves a thorough investigation of the competing theoretical foundation that is key to international relations to fulfil the aim of this study. These are liberal, realistic and Marxist ideas. Liberal perspectives emphasize that man is a logical way of weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of choices and their consequences.

Individuals may find their own potential for improvement because too liberal thinkers' particular inclination for democratic liberalism, which is at the core of America's democracy, and the laissez-faire that characterizes economic liberalism. This is capitalism's intellectual basis. In an anarchic international environment, neoliberal institutionalism - a modern form of liberalism - argues that nations would cooperate because it is in their best interests. The imperatives for international collaboration are explained by the theory of games, which highlights the problem of the convicts in evaluating the different options available and their probable outcomes. The realistic viewpoint, which considers realism to be one of the most important think tanks in international affairs, demonstrates that states behave in unique ways in response to national concerns. Realism emerged as a response to the idealism that led to the creation of the League of Nations, and it took a more normative approach, passing the structural framework to the UN. In his book "The Peloponnesian War," which analyses the show of strength by strong nations over the weak, Thucydides was a father of realism, a replica of the realistic tradition. Thucydides' account of the Melian Dialogue between Sparta and Athens. In the 5th century B.C., they were both Greek city states with hegemonic power. Each of these nations was wary of the other. The tiny Melos State, which tried to preserve its neutrality in the hegemonic battle between Athens and Sparta, found it impossible to maintain its neutrality in the hegemonic conflict between Athens and Sparta. Athens wanted to conquer Melos and prepared to assault her if she refused to submit to their rule. Athens' bluff was called by Melos. As a consequence, Athens launched an unprovoked assault on Melos and defeated it. Thucydides arrived to the conclusion that the victor defined justice in this situation, which is a frequent characteristic of international relations. Realism emerged as a response to the idealism that led to the creation of the League of Nations, and it took a more normative approach, passing the structural framework to the UN.

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Morgenthau also addressed realistic views on world issues in his book "Politics between the Nations." International politics, according to Morgenthau, is a fight for power at the individual, state, and international levels. A party's attempt to have a person or a state behave contrary to previously recognised goals or interests is known as power exercise.

Marxism is a historical viewpoint that emphasizes class conflict, and it was developed by Karl Marx (1818–1883). The ruling class and the subject class were his two basic socioeconomic divisions in society. He said that since the ruling class owns and controls the means of production, it derives its power from this process, which it continues to apply to the subject class. Marx identified four stages in the evolution of Western society. This is the time period of ancient communism, feudalism, and capitalism. Primitive communism, which was basically a classless society, is embodied in prehistoric civilization.

As a result, society evolved into the ancient society's rulers and slaves, the feudal system's lords and servants, and the capitalist society, which comprised workers and bourgeoisie. In the Communist Manifesto, co-written by Friedrich Engels and Marx in 1848, Marx said that his social taxonomy is an economic class in terms of economic interests, not a functional income class. He claimed that these economic groups are the consequence of society's choice of production relations, rather than being permanent in nature. He regarded capitalism to be an oppressive economic system, and that a long-term capitalist framework would bind the working class to the bourgeoisie's whims and fancies forever. His theoretical support was for a revolutionary social reconstruction in which the proletariat was urged to take over the State's ownership and production facilities in order to improve their living standards by replacing capitalism with socialism. According to Marxist normative and active thought, this would aid in the reduction of disparities and the dependence on class dominance. This book emphasises the Leninist version of Marxism, and many of the ideas discussed above were applied to the Middle East conflict. Second, we will examine postwar events that resulted in the creation of two superpowers in the international system: The United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Cold War imperatives brought forth by soviet-Marxist political expansionism (sovietization) into the Soviet Orbit were coordinated by

Eastern European countries - Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and parts of East Germany (as farcically called the "People Democrats"). "I think it must be the policy of the United States to assist free peoples that reject attempted enslavement by armed minority or by foreign force," he said in his statement. During the bi-polar years, which saw a series of proxy wars as a balance of power between Middle Eastern countries, this policy thrust, which is based on the US's geostrategic objectives, has been the basic idea of American foreign policy.

The US's customary support for Israel and Soviet assistance for moderate Arab countries like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq became apparent in the many conflicts that occurred in that area. This will be expanded upon throughout the process. Third, the Arab community's division has worsened tensions in the Middle East. Finally, the book's conclusion will concentrate on the Arab reaction or revisionist movements against the State of Israel and its imperial supporters, as well as the present bilateral or multilateral diplomacy to resolve the issue.

### **5. Significance of the Study Statement of the Problem**

The research is expected to be helpful to the Secretary of the United Nation and the management, since the study aims to uncover the underlying cause of the conflict between Arab and Israel. The research will also help both governments, since the study seeks to resolve the long-lasting dispute between the two countries. The study also offers significant advantages to scholars who want to undertake research on comparable subjects as a guide.

### **6. The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars Statement of the Problem**

The Middle East has been one of the most volatile and violent areas of the global political system since World War II ended. The Middle East's postwar history has been marked by an exceptionally high number of inter-state conflicts. This chapter examines the causes of the most frequent kind of Middle Eastern conflict, namely Arab-Israeli violence. This section excludes conflicts that are unrelated to the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as the Yemen war of 1961-64 and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. This chapter covers the 1948 Palestine Wars, the 1956 Suez War, the June 1967 Six-Day War, the War of Attrition 1969-70, the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, the Lebanon War of 1982, and the Gulf War of 1991 and 2021 ISRAEL PALESTINE WAR. The causes of these disagreements are being examined to determine if any broad patterns emerge.

### **7. The United States' Interests in Central Asia and their Challenges**

United States of America, Central Asia is becoming more important. "Stability in the region is essential and of critical national interest," Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asians in 2004.

1. But now, three parties in Central Asia are attacking US interests: Russia and China, Taliban and sympathizers, and the authoritarian misrule of Central Asian governments. Worse, it's not impossible that some local governments may fall apart. According to

- National Intelligence Director John Negroponte, Central Asia is plagued by political stagnation and tyranny, extensive corruption, widespread poverty and socioeconomic disparity, and other circumstances that promote extremist sentiment and terrorism.
2. In the worst-case scenario, central authority may disappear as rival clans or regions vie for control, paving the door for an increase of terrorist and criminal operations in failed nations like Somalia and, under the Taliban's rule, Afghanistan. Although some of these attacks are unavoidable, others are the result of faults in US strategy that allowed opponents to exploit those vulnerabilities. This book examines these flaws and offers solutions to help America get out of its present bind. U.S. interests are mainly strategic in Central Asia. They come first from the closeness of Russia, Iran and China to this region.
  3. Indeed, the US and the West as a whole are growing increasingly reliant on the CEE region's stability and growth. The United States has a significant investment in Afghanistan, as well as a long-term commitment to the nation and Central Asia. The future of the region is critical to the progress of the Global War on Terrorism and the United States' security interests in Eurasia in general, as well as maintaining airspace and territory access in Asia's heartland, developing alternative energy sources, and promoting liberty and democratic development.
  4. As a result, any US presence in Central Asia is seen by Russia and China as a significant challenge, if not a threat, to their vital interests, which are fundamentally imperial in nature and entail a reduction in the effective sovereignty of Central Asian countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that under both the Clinton and Bush administration, the primary objective of the United States was to uphold the integrity, independence, sovereignty and safety of these countries against the attempts of Russia and China to dominate them and circumscribe their freedom.
  5. As Deputy Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Lorne Craner stated in June 2004, Central Asia's main strategic goal is to see the emergence of autonomous, democratic, and stable states committed to the type of political and economic reforms necessary for modern societies and the road to integration and the international economy. The strategy we're taking is based on three goals that we're pursuing at the same time. The first of these goals is to ensure that everyone is safe. Our counter-terrorism cooperation helps these nations maintain their sovereignty and independence while also providing the stability they need to undertake long-term reforms. However, in order to achieve their full potential, these nations must allow for more transparency, respect for human rights, and a push toward democratic policies, in order to become really stable over time and completely integrated into the international community.
  6. Finally, the development of the economic potential of Central Asia, particularly its large natural resources, Changes to the free-market economy and foreign direct investment are being demanded. Only in this manner can the inhabitants of the area enhance their well-being, to diversify global energy sources and make it easier for them to enter the global economy In other words, although energy access is important, it is not and should not be the driving force behind American policy in this area. It's more of a means to an end. Central Asian governments may expand their customer base and get access to global markets by opening up access to reciprocal markets and energy businesses. This enables them to sell their products at world market prices. In this view, anti-monopoly is the driving force behind US policy, while monopolistic policies are the driving force behind Moscow's and Beijing's policies.
  7. This American policy to protect these nations' independence, integrity, and security builds on America's long-standing geostrategic goal in preventing any Eurasian empire from presenting a threat to it on either continent. And there's little question that imperial success pushes Moscow and Beijing to push their Central Asian hegemony ambitions even farther. They have long recognised that there is a rising strong power struggle or fight for influence in Central Asia, which jeopardizes any other method of establishing organised relationship structures there.
  8. A second important interest in the US has been shown since 11 September 2001 (9/11) that is, protecting the United States and Europe from Islamic terrorism, as embodied by Osama Bin Laden and perpetrated by the Taliban and their followers. The triumph of Afghanistan is, therefore, a crucial interest which has to be realized just as, if not more than in Iraq, the final defeat of the Taliban and the creation of a safe, functional and legitimate Afghan state. In relation to energy exploration, refining, and marketing, First and foremost, US businesses rely on what is known as "open door" or "equitable access." Central Asian nations will be unable to attain real economic or foreign policy independence if sales of their enormous energy reserves are restricted to Russia due to a lack of pipelines or oil and gas. Access to energy on an equal footing with American and other Western businesses therefore clearly implies the larger aim of safeguarding these countries' independence, sovereignty, and potential for secure development. Unsurprisingly, the United States' energy strategy has emphasized the development of many pipelines and linkages with foreign energy consumers and providers, including electricity in recent years with regard to India.
  9. The energy-producing countries of Central Asia recognised that diversifying their pipelines is critical to their safety and prosperity, as it aligns the interests of the United States and Central Asia. With tremendous success in the oil market, Washington

tried to prevent the establishment of a Russian pipeline or overall energy monopoly, but with far less success in the natural gas market. At the same time, the United States has attempted to isolate Iran from Central Asian influence by pressuring nations to build pipelines that bypass Iran and imposing sanctions on governments and businesses that do business with Iran.

### 8. Summary

America lost its Karshikh Khanabad base and continues to suffer pressure in Kyrgyzstan, where its grip on Manas is tenuous, and elsewhere, as well as NATO allies fight a reinvigorated and strengthened Taliban on conditions far less favorable than in 2001, due to the attacks on the United States' position in Central Asia. Worse, a scenario in which Uzbekistan can only be forcefully involved in a crisis by Russia and maybe China, while Washington is totally excluded, is a strategic setback for the United States. Professor Alexander Cooley of Barnard College stated, "This eviction is the worst possible outcome for the United States. "The US was not honored to uphold the policy concept and to leave K2 willingly, nor was it able to ensure the operational use of the facility." Uzbekistan clearly only listens to Moscow and Beijing, and America is definitely not the primary ally of Kazakhstan, even under the ideal conditions. The State Department thus expects Kazakhstan to be the possible strongest partner for America in Central Asia and a potential leader in promoting its objectives, which is essentially unpredictable and cannot be used to build a successful US strategy in the future. Of course, as Secretary Rice said, Kazakhstan cannot really be described as "a gateway for change," when its domestic trends go in the other direction. While Kazakhstan has made many suggestions for regional cooperation amongst local governments and has sometimes defied Russia by exporting gas to Georgia and joining the BTC pipeline, its appeals for regional integration have fallen on deaf ears, and its limits to autonomous action are apparent. As a number of recent agreements reaffirm, remain in force. Indeed, as one Russian news article observes, "Astana's policy has not once gone against Moscow's interests throughout the years of independence." While Kazakhstan will continue to cooperate with the United States on pipeline issues, equipment acquisition, and self-defense training in and around the Caspian Sea, as well as participate in the Partnership for Peace and accept foreign investment, no one should expect Washington to lead Central Asia against Moscow and Beijing and to forget its government's rigorous balanced policies. The US Government should also not overlook chances for full interaction with all the other countries. In fact, that would be a grave error. As Daniel Fried, Europe and Eurasia Assistant Secretary of State, stated, "US can't and will not have a one-dimensional relationship with any nation in the area that is focused simply on safety concerns or economic interests." Similarly, James MacDougall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, said that "your security objectives cannot avoid the political development agenda and you cannot prevent your political development goal from hampering your security and energy interests. They must go together in hand." Any US strategy in Central Asia should use

every chance for constructive interaction with the local administrations.

### 9. Conclusion

The United States must first analyse where things went wrong to recover its foothold in Central Asia. First of all, American errors consist of weaknesses in its political processes and, perhaps more significantly, in its foreign policy toward and from Central Asia. The government cannot regain America's standing in Central Asia without dealing swiftly and firmly with both sets of problems. To begin with, the policy process, especially the interagency process, is broken when it comes to Central Asia and many other issues, such as Korea and Russia, as well as security cooperation in general. In fact, some professionals and observers believe that there is no consistent policymaking process because the administration prefers it that way. The Pentagon has often attempted to arrogate greater foreign policy authority to its auspices and adopt a tough stance in accomplishing this or otherwise, administrative officials will be pitted against one another with no clear boundary to draw. Alternatively, the State Department advocates for complete democratization and democracy, while raising interest rates. For instance that democracy, not security interests, are the primary agenda item in Central Asia and so prevent discussion of other options. In fact, democracy prevails over the latter. 67 For example, before to Secretary Rice's October 2005 visit to the area, assistant Secretary Fried stated: "U.S. policy and economic reform objectives in the region will not be subject to security concerns." The Pentagon stresses strategic interests of the U.S. in the area, whereas the State Department emphasises democracy as its principal goal, and refers to the words of President Bush on the topic from his second opening ceremony. 69 Under the wars in Afghanistan and on terrorism starting at the end of 2001, the interests of American security inevitably triumphed in US policy to 20 countries in the area and in its aid packages. Central Asian leaders quickly recognised that their position had become freer as long as they provided the appropriate verbal promises that the internal problems in their own nations that caused discontent would be improved. After Western donors, especially the US government, realised this truth, their financial resources for institutional and other changes started to dry up under pressure from domestic expenditure reductions for democracy promotion and increased regional repression. The Bush Administration's rhetoric on democracy was therefore disregarded by the reality that in 2003-05 it spent constantly less and less money on democratization initiatives, with very little finances to begin with. And because Central Asian leaders, who ignored the reform imperatives at home for their own safety, did not have a genuine punishment in 2005 for U.S. policy in this region to guarantee its general goals. This strategy and its tools, such as Karshi Khanabad, were thus susceptible to any reversal of our fortune. The Pakistani military will end its controversial military operations in the Semi-Autonomous North Waziristan area as part of this deal. In return, local Taliban activists will cease attacking 26 Pakistani troops, stop crossing close eastern Afghanistan, attacking Al Qaeda and Taliban activists from Western or Afghan forces. For Pakistan, this was an acceptance of the fact that its military could never vanquish tribal activists in an area where the jurisdiction of Pakistan never stretched.

But for the opponents, the agreement represents an effective amnesty for the militants that enables them to enter into Afghanistan even more freely and to continue their violent goal. While authorities in Pakistan argue that foreign terrorists may only remain in the region if they comply with Pakistanian law and keep away from militancy, it is unclear how this can be implemented in an area that has grown more remote from Pakistani authority after this deal.

### 10. Recommendations

A good policy must learn from and overcome these errors. The management must thus take the following measures. First, the dysfunctional policy process must be repaired. The government must decide on the actual significance of Central Asia to the USA and provide the support for this investment with adequate material and political resources. To this purpose, once an agreement has been reached, the participants must be subjected to political discipline imposed by the President and his government. They must establish and carry out defined interdepartmental objectives for the US presence in Central Asia. In view of the current scenario in the area, the security and independence of these countries must come first, else democracy would not be imaginable at a distance. However, this does not imply ignoring democracy as a problem. Rather, America must include non-terrorist nations, civic society and opposition organisations. The administration must argue that international agreements that maintain these traditions have been ratified and that the US is not seeking to replace them, but is working to make both its nations safer and wealthier. Since their interest in a violent overthrow is at risk, this argument may be persuasive. To fulfil its needs, it will need more assistance as well as genuine economic and other initiatives.

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